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I. Introduction 
In War and Responsibility, John Hart Ely argues that Congress 
has willingly and cravenly surrendered its rightful role as the 
branch responsible for determining when and the extent to which 
t PhD Candidate in Law, Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; Resident Fellow, 
Yale Information Society Project. I am indebted to a conversation with Jack Balkin, 
Oona Hathaway, and John Witt for the question-"How will killer robots affect the war 
power?"-that inspired this piece. Thanks to the North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation for the opportunity to develop my 
answer, to my commentators Curt Bradley and Maggie Gardner for their insightful input, 
and to other symposium participants for their clarifying questions and contributions. 
This work also benefited from commentary from Eyal Benvenisti and Harold Hongju 
Koh. 
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the United States engages in armed conflicts. 1 Since the 
publication of this seminal work on the war power, presidents have 
continued to commit troops to hostilities absent or outside of 
explicit congressional authorizations-and the legislature and the 
judiciary rarely challenge such actions. 
Meanwhile, the United States is investing heavily in unmanned 
military weapon systems,2 and the U.S. Department of Defense has 
described increasing weapons' autonomous capabilities as a "high 
priority."3 In its annual "Unmanned Systems Integrated 
Roadmap," the Department discusses its intended "continued 
development, production, test[ing], trammg, operation, and 
sustainment of unmanned systems technology across DoD" for the 
next twenty-five years.4 One of the ultimate goals is to "[t]ake the 
'man' out of unmanned [systems]."5 How might increasingly 
autonomous weapon systems-also known as "killer robots"-
affect the constitutional war power? 
Drones, cyber operations, and other technological advances in 
weaponry already allow the United States to intervene militarily 
with minimal boots on the ground, and increased autonomy in 
weapon systems will further reduce risk to soldiers. As human 
troops are augmented and supplanted by robotic ones,6 one of the 
remammg incentives for Congress to check presidential 
I JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF 
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (Princeton University Press, 1993). Ely's understanding of 
the appropriate division of the war power is shared by many contemporary scholars. See, 
e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 158-61 (Yale University Press, 1990); John Yoo, War, 
Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 794 (2004) 
(acknowledging "that Ely's view [of the constitutional design of war powers] represents 
the majority view among academics and has a certain intuitive attraction by appealing to 
the standard working model of the separation of powers that prevails in domestic affairs" 
but arguing that it is no longer appropriate in an age of terrorism). 
2 See Jack Browne, UAV Markets Robust Despite Declining Spending, DEF. ELEC. 
(Feb. 15, 2012), http://defenseelectronicsmag.com/electronic-countermeasures/uav-
markets-robust-despite-declining-spending. 
3 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY 2013-2038 
67 (2013) [hereinafter "ROADMAP"]. 
4 Id. at v. 
5 Id. at 25. 
6 Jeffrey S. Thumher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully 
Autonomous Targeting, 67 JOINT FORCE Q. 77, 79 (2012) ("The expectation is that robots 
on the battlefield will form the bulk of detachments, such as infantry units that would be 
comprised of 150 human soldiers working alongside 2,000 robots."). 
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warmongering-popular outrage at the loss of American lives-
will diminish. By making it politically easier to justify the use of 
military force, autonomous weapon systems will contribute to the 
growing concentration of the war power in the hands of the 
Executive, with potential implications for the international 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 
II. The Constitutional War Power 
A. The Academic War Power 
Under international law, states enjoy various rights by virtue of 
their sovereignty; these include the right to create binding 
international legal obligations via treaty, the right to use defensive 
force against armed attacks on their territory, and the right to 
decide when to engage in hostilities. 7 Which domestic authority. 
has the power to exercise these sovereign rights, however, is left to 
the discretion of the state. 8 
The U.S. Constitution does not clearly assign the war power to 
any single branch. It grants Congress the powers to create military 
forces and to "declare war,"9 which has long been understood to 
include authorizations of minor uses of military force. 10 The 
President, meanwhile, is the "commander in chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States" 11 and is assumed to have the authority 
to act unilaterally to repel attacks on U.S. territory. 12 Through its 
power of the purse, Congress has an implicit ability to end military 
engagements by eliminating their funding. 13 For example, the 
7 By joining the United Nations, most modern states have accepted the Charter's 
limitations on the lawful exercise of this right. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
8 Cf U.N. Charter art. 43 (providing that states making armed forces available to 
the United Nations will do so "in accordance with a special agreement or agreements" 
which "shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes"). 
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.11. 
IO Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1804); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37, 40-41, 43, 
45 (1800). 
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. Matt Waxman highlights the President's additional 
ability to threaten war and discusses its implications for the war powers debate. Matthew 
C. Waxman, The Power to Threaten War, 123 YALE L.J. 1626 (2014). 
12 Cf The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1863); see also Michael D. Ramsey, 
Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1543, 1623 (2002). 
I3 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8(1), 9(7). Even the strongest advocates for a powerful 
Executive concede that Congress may control the Executive in this manner. John C. 
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, in conjunction with prior funding 
bans, helped end the Vietnam War by terminating all military 
financial support for the government of South Vietnam. 14 Should 
all else fail to check an overzealous president, Congress retains the 
power of impeachment. 15 
Most war power scholars today agree that, as a matter of 
constitutional law, a president wishing to engage in a significant 
military action must receive advance congressional authorization. 
This authorization may but need not take the form of a formal 
declaration of war. Ely put it somewhat more strongly: "[A]ll 
wars, big or small, 'declared' in so many words or not ... ha[ve] 
to be legislatively authorized." 16 Additionally, Congress has the 
ability to impose binding limitations on the president's possible 
uses of force. 17 Thus, excepting defensive uses of force, although 
the president may determine how best to conduct hostilities, he or 
she may exercise that discretion only with congressional 
authorization and within congressionally proscribed boundaries. 
Despite these formal limitations, as will be discussed in greater 
detail below, modem presidents regularly employ military force 
without congressional authorization or outside of congressionally 
approved bounds. Accordingly, a minority of scholars read the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause and the Constitution's grant of 
Executive power to permit the president to unilaterally initiate or 
expand military action. 18 
Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1674 (2002). Bruce 
Ackerman and Oona Hathaway argue, however, that the idea that Congress needs to do 
nothing to stop an unwanted Executive war is false: rather, "Congress has to act 
affirmatively if it wants to stop a war in its tracks," and, because of the threat of a 
presidential veto, Congress must fight an uphill battle to impose spending limitations. 
Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the 
Crisis of Presidential legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447,477,486 (201 I). 
14 This congressional check was subverted during the Iran-Contra scandal. For a 
detailed account, see KOH, supra note I. 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I,§§ 2(5), 3(6). 
l6 ELY, supra note I, at 3; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2057 
(2005). 
17 Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 452-57 (discussing relevant 
constitutional text and historical precedents). 
18 See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original 
Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 174 ( 1996) (arguing that the 
Constitution was written to encourage unilateral presidential action). 
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In short, despite the fundamental and sovereign nature of the 
war power, its implications for American lives and treasure, and 
the long history of U.S. military engagements, 19 whether and the 
extent to which the president can legitimately engage U.S. troops 
in hostilities absent congressional authorization remains a question 
of heated academic debate. 20 
B. The War Power in Practice 
As the academic debate rages on, presidents regularly assert 
the right to use U.S. force unilaterally. For much of early 
American history, presidents deferred to Congress in making 
decisions regarding when to commit American troops to hostilities 
and understood the "self defense" exception to be quite 
circumscribed. 21 As time passed, however, presidents came to 
read the self defense exception so broadly that an autonomous tank 
could drive through it. While originally understood as being 
limited to repelling attacks on American soil or possibly on 
American ships, this exception has since been expanded to justify 
using force abroad to protect American lives, property, or national 
interests-or even foreign citizens.22 Congress rarely challenges 
such justifications.23 
As a result, presidents today are seen as having "a very free 
hand in using military force that does not rise to the level of 'war' 
in the constitutional sense-that is, force not rising to large-scale 
and long-duration uses of ground troops."24 Most recently, the 
Obama Administration asserted that it need not seek congressional 
19 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INSTANCES OF THE USE OF UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2015 (2013) (noting that the United States has 
used force hundreds of times). 
20 See William Michael Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 
1333, I 333 (2006) ("Few areas of constitutional law have produced as much heated 
debate as the war powers area, heat produced in no small part by the passionate belief 
that this is a subject of incalculable consequence."); see also William Michael Treanor, 
Fame, the Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 695, 700 
(1997) ( discussing the debate). 
2 I See Waxman, supra note 11, at I 626 ( citing sources); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Constitutional Custom and the President's War Authority 5, 8 (Aug. 26, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
22 See Bradley, supra note 21. 
23 See Waxman, supra note 11, at 1626 (citing sources); Bradley, supra note 21. 
24 Waxman, supra note 11, at 1628. 
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authorization for military strikes in Syria in response to Bashar al-
Assad's alleged use of chemical weapons against civilians25-
notwithstanding the fact that such strikes would "push the legal 
envelope further even than Kosovo, the outer bound to date of 
presidential unilateralism. "26 
Accordingly, some have concluded that a resolution to the 
academic debate is purely academic. Even if the majority 
academic position-that presidents often exercise a war power that 
rightly belongs to Congress-is correct, it sometimes seems that 
"[l]aw does little to constrain the modem executive."27 
C. Checks on the Executive's Exercise of the War Power 
What legal checks do exist to limit the Executive's war power? 
Given the constitutional emphasis on the importance of the 
separation of powers, it is natural to look to the legislature and the 
judiciary. Ely suggests, for example, that both of these branches 
have a constitutional obligation to prevent a president from 
unilaterally waging war without congressional authorization.28 
Congress, via the power of the purse, can refuse to fund 
unauthorized engagements; judges can rule unauthorized wars 
"unconstitutional unless and until such authorization [is] 
forthcoming" and thereby force the legislative branch to fulfill its 
constitutional duties.29 In practice, however, neither the legislature 
nor the judiciary has much incentive or interest in interfering with 
Executive decisions regarding the use of military force. 30 
25 Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the President on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statemen 
t-president-syria). 
26 Jack Goldsmith, Why Doesn't President Obama Seek Congressional Approval 
for Syria?, LAWFARE (Aug. 28, 2013, 8:25 AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/ 
why-doesnt-president-obama-seek-congressional-approval-for-syria/. 
27 ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADIS0NIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010); see also Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 
494 (concluding that the Obama Administration's continuation of the Bush 
Administration's war policies creates a precedent that "stacks the deck further against the 
responsible use of the power of the purse"); Bradley, supra note 21, at 34-35 (discussing 
the possibility that "there is no real 'law' of war powers"). 
28 But see Yoo, supra note 18, at 174 (arguing that the only constitutional 
limitations on the President's war power are the congressional powers of funding and 
impeachment). 
29 ELY, supra note I, at 54. 
30 See ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY ix (1973) (noting that 
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Congress often seems eager to punt decisions regarding 
deployment of troops to the president. Both the 2002 Iraq 
resolution and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, for example, were 
broadly worded resolutions that allowed the President to determine 
whether or not to involve the United States in the Iraq and 
Vietnam wars, respectively.31 Punting is a win-win political 
option: if the engagement goes well, legislators can claim partial 
credit for it; if it goes badly, they can distance themselves and 
criticize. And, once troops are committed to hostilities, Congress 
is even less likely to exercise its power of the purse, either because 
it fears allegations of not adequately supporting our men and 
women in uniform or because it is institutionally incapable of 
acting. 32 
After Vietnam, Congress attempted to reassert its role with 
regard to decisions concerning the deployment of U.S. troops by 
passing the 1973 War Powers Resolution.33 The Resolution 
provides that a president can send U.S. armed forces into action 
only after a formal congressional declaration of war, a statutory 
authorization, or a national emergency "created by attack upon the 
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. "34 
If the president commits armed forces to military action, he or she 
must notify Congress of this within forty-eight hours and, if 
Congress does not authorize the deployment, the troops must 
return after sixty days (with an additional thirty day withdrawal 
period).35 
The most damning of the varied critiques leveled at the 
Resolution has been borne out by history: it has been utterly 
ineffective at forcing Congress to clearly authorize U.S. 
involvement in hostilities. Nearly all would agree with Ely's 
assessment that, "thanks to a combination of presidential defiance, 
the erosion of the legislature's control over the war power "was as much a matter of 
congressional abdication as of presidential usurpation"). 
31 Louis Fisher, Deciding on War Against Iraq: Institutional Failures, 118 POL. 
Sci. Q. 389, 405 (2013) ("[T]he resolutions are virtually identical in transferring to the 
president the sole decision to go to war and determine its scope and duration .... Instead 
of acting as the people's representatives and preserving the republican form of 
government, [Congress] gave the president unchecked power."). 
32 See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 450. 
33 War Powers Resolution, 93 P.L. 148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973). 
34 Id.§ 154l(c). 
35 Id. §§ 1543, 1544. 
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congressional irresolution, and judicial abstention, the War Powers 
Resolution has not worked."36 
One of the more powerful incentives for Congress to check 
Executive war-making would seem to be public opinion.37 Popular 
protests famously (if only eventually) spurred Congress to defund 
the Vietnam War. Accordingly, in arguing that the legislature 
needs to reclaim its war power authority, the Cato Institute 
concludes that "Congressional courage of the kind needed to 
reclaim the war power will not be forthcoming unless and until 
American citizens demand it."38 Absent wars as deadly and widely 
felt as Vietnam, however, it seems unlikely the American public 
will make any such demands. 
Meanwhile, the judiciary shows little enthusiasm for limiting 
Executive usurpation of the war power, especially given the 
legislature's apparent acquiescence.39 Ely might correctly read the 
Constitution as requiring federal courts to intervene if the 
President wages war absent congressional approval: "[T]he court 
would ask whether Congress had authorized [the war], and if it had 
not, rule the war unconstitutional unless and until such 
authorization was forthcoming. "40 But the judiciary has shown 
little desire, then or now, to police the appropriate division of the 
war power.41 Citing the political question doctrine, plaintiffs' lack 
of standing, mootness, and ripeness concerns, judges largely avoid 
ruling on the merits of the issue. 42 
A remaining legal check on the Executive Branch is-
somewhat counter-intuitively-applied by the Executive Branch 
itself. Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison argue that the 
36 ELY, supra note I, at 49. 
37 Public outrage at American deaths will affect both political branches, but 
presidents are somewhat more insulated than congresspersons. 
38 Gene Healy, Reclaiming the War Power, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR 
POLICYMAKERS 107, 114 (7th ed. 2009). 
39 See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Kucinich v. 
Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d I JO (D.D.C. 2011). 
40 ELY, supra note I, at 54. 
41 See Robert E. Paradise, The Least Interested Branch, 107 HARV. L. REV.2117, 
2120-22 (1994) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (discussing how, 
even at the time War and Responsibility was published, the judiciary had long avoided 
deciding cases brought to check unilateral executive uses of force). 
42 See id. at 2120. 
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Executive Branch is constrained by law in two ways: through "the 
internalization of legal norms by relevant actors within the 
Executive Branch and the threat of external sanctions for violating 
those norms."43 The Executive Branch contains thousands of 
lawyers with a common socialization to take law "seriously." 
Additionally, entities like the Justice Department's Office of Legal 
Council, which advises the White House on the legality of 
proposed actions, issue credible opinions largely because of 
internal procedures that standardize interpretations of the law 
across administrations.44 Bradley and Morrison suggest that these 
actors are constrained by law, both in terms of what actions they 
believe appropriate or possible and because of individual 
reputational and general political costs associated with being 
perceived as acting lawlessly.45 But while law may act as a 
general internal check on the Executive Branch, in areas where the 
law itself is unclear-as is the case regarding the proper division 
of the war power-Executive practice over time may alter the 
common understanding of what the law permits or forbids.46 
Scholars tend to agree that the constitutional war power is 
intended to be a shared one, such that both the president and 
Congress are involved in decisions regarding the deployment of 
U.S. troops. In reality, modem presidents regularly commit the 
United States to military action without express congressional 
authorization or expand hostilities outside of congressionally 
imposed limitations. While there are some legal, political, and 
practical checks on excessive unilateral uses of force by the 
Executive, practice is establishing a constitutional "gloss" that 
expands the president's war power authority at the Legislature's 
43 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical 
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1132 (2013). 
44 Id. at 1133. 
45 Id. at 1132-40. While law likely does constrain options available to the 
Executive Branch, it is important not to overstate its influence. Both Presidents George 
W. Bush and Barack Obama have been critiqued, for example, for circumventing OLC 
procedures to get legal cover for a desired policy position. See Jack Balkin, George W. 
Obama and the OLC, BALKINIZATION (June 18, 2011, 8:35 AM), http://balkin.blo 
gspot.com/2011 /06/george-w-obama-and-olc.html. 
46 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 
( 1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting that, where the text of the Constitution is 
unclear, how the government operates in practice over time can create a constitutional 
"gloss" on presidential power); see also Bradley & Morrison, supra note 43, at 1148 
(discussing the potential "gravitational pull" of Executive action on the law). 
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expense.47 Given this context, how is the advent of autonomous 
weapon systems-so-called "killer robots"-likely to affect the 
war power? 
III. Killer Robots and the Expansion of the Executive War 
Power 
A. What Are Autonomous Weapon Systems? 
An "autonomous weapon system" is "a weapon system that, 
based on conclusions derived from gathered information and 
preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting 
and engaging targets."48 In contrast, a weapon system will be 
merely "semi-autonomous" if a human operator must take some 
affirmative action before a specific target is selected or engaged.49 
Thus, a remote-controlled drone that suggests a target to a human 
operator but that cannot engage that target without approval is 
semi-autonomous; a drone that independently selects and engages 
targets after deployment is autonomous. Weapon systems with 
autonomous capabilities must also be distinguished from 
"automated" weapons, like trip-wire sentry guns or weight-based 
47 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11. Scholars regularly discuss historical 
practice in evaluating whether and when the President may use military force absent 
congressional authorization. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 
50 B.U. L. REV. 19 (1970); Jane C. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War 
Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, I 06 YALE L.J. 845 ( 1996) (reviewing LOUIS 
FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)); see also ELY, supra note I, at 9-10; 
Bradley, supra note 21, at I ("[H]istorical practice has played an especially large role in 
constitutional claims and debates in the war powers area."). 
48 Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 
36 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), at 16, available at http://papers.ssm. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2534567; see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DIR. 3000.09, 
AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14 (Nov. 2 I, 2012) (defining "autonomous weapon 
systems" as ones which, "once activated, can select and engage targets without further 
intervention by a human operator"); MAJOR ANDRE HAIDER, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS (2014), available at 
http://www.dglr.de/fi1eadmin/inhalte/dglr/fb/q3/veranstaltungen/2013 _uav _ autonomie/U 
AS_OPS_in_Contested_Environments.pdf (noting that NATO defines "autonomous 
unmanned aircraft" as those "capable of understanding higher-level intent and direction, 
sensing its environment, and, based on a set of rules and limitations, choosing from 
alternatives and taking actions to bring about an optimal but potentially unpredictable 
state without human input"). 
49 See Crootof, supra note 48, at 27-28. 
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landmines, which are purely reactive.50 
Once the stuff of science fiction, weapon systems with 
growing levels of autonomy are increasingly being integrated into 
states' armed forces. 51 South Korea's SGR-Als are stationary, 
armed robots used to monitor the demilitarized zone: allegedly, 
they can identify potential human targets, voice commands to 
surrender, and use lethal force independently when operating in an 
autonomous mode.52 The Israeli Harpy Loitering Weapon is 
designed to detect, attack, and destroy enemy radar emitters. 53 
Although the individual launching the Harpy knows that it will 
only engage radars within the programmed parameters, he or she 
does not know which specific radars will be attacked.54 Russia and 
China are both employing PMK-2 encapsulated torpedo mines-a 
sea mine that, instead of exploding when triggered, opens a 
capsule that releases a torpedo that then selects and engages a 
target. 55 Not to be outdone, the United States is developing and 
employing a host of increasingly autonomous ground, air, and sea-
based weapon systems. 
B. How Autonomous Weapon Systems Make War "Easier" 
Recently, some states, non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals have called for a complete ban on the development and 
use of autonomous weapon systems.56 Ban advocates advance a 
number of powerful moral, policy, and strategic arguments, the 
50 See id. at 27; see also HAIDER, supra note 48 (noting that NATO distinguishes 
"autonomous" from "automated" aircraft on the grounds that the latter's "actions and 
outcomes are scripted and predictable"). 
51 See Crootof, supra note 48, at 32-35. 
52 See Samsung Techwin SGR-A /, Sentry Guard Robot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-a I .htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
53 See Harpy Loitering Weapon, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUST., http://www.iai.co. 
il/2013/16143-16153-en/IAl.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
54 See Paul Scharre, Autonomy, "Killer Robots, " and Human Control in the Use of 
Force-Part I, JUST SEC. (July 9, 2014, 11: 17 AM), http://justsecurity.org/12708/ 
autonomy-killer-robots-human-control-force-part/. 
55 See id. 
56 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW 
SCH., LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012) [hereinafter 
LOSING HUMANITY]; Sarah Knuckey, Start of First Inter-Governmental Expert Meeting 
on Autonomous Weapons, JUST SEC. (May 13, 2014, 3:17 PM), http://justsecurity.org/ 
2014/05/13/start-inter-govemmental-expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons/ (reporting 
that Ecuador, Egypt, and Pakistan have called for a ban). 
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most relevant one for this paper is the suggestion that autonomous 
weapon systems will make war "too easy."57 This claim takes 
various forms, but a shared animating concern is that the use of 
autonomous weapon systems will increase risks to civilians. First, 
many fear that the use of autonomous weapon systems will 
transfer the human costs of war from the technologically superior 
state's soldiers to its enemy's civilians. Second, some worry that 
by reducing risks to combatants, states will be more willing to use 
force (as opposed to diplomacy or non-violent coercive measures) 
to achieve political objectives and, as a result, more civilians will 
be harmed. 
1. Transferring Riskfrom Combatants to Civilians? 
Technological advances in weaponry are often intended to 
decrease risks to the operator. The crossbow, the bomber, and the 
unmanned aerial vehicle have all supplanted earlier weapons 
largely because they reduce combatants' exposure to physically 
and psychologically dangerous situations. Autonomous weapon 
systems promise similar benefits. Many are troubled, however, by 
the possibility that these benefits to the weapons' operators will 
come at the expense of enemy civilians. 58 
Some of these concerns are not well founded. One such claim 
deals with the distinction requirement, a foundational norm in the 
law of armed conflict.59 Parties to a conflict must at all times 
distinguish between lawful targets ( combatants, other military 
objectives, and civilians directly participating in hostilities) and 
unlawful targets (civilians, civilian objects, and wounded 
combatants).60 As corollaries, parties are prohibited from using 
inherently indiscriminate weapons or launching indiscriminate 
attacks.61 With this in mind, some advocates of a complete ban on 
autonomous weapon systems argue that, because such weaponry is 
currently incapable of distinguishing between lawful and unlawful 
57 But see Crootof, supra note 48, at 36-47 (critiquing pro-ban legal arguments). 
58 See, e.g., LOSING HUMANITY,supra note 56, at 39-41. 
59 Among other places, this customary rule is codified in the First Additional 
Protocol. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 48, 51, 52, 
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
60 See id. 
6 I See id. art. 5 I. 
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targets, its use will unlawfully endanger civilians.62 However, just 
because autonomous weapon systems do not (yet) have the 
capacity to distinguish between lawful and unlawful targets, that 
does not mean they cannot be used in a discriminating manner.63 
And, as evidenced by autonomous weapon systems in use today, it 
is possible to employ them without unnecessarily endangering 
civilians or undermining the distinction requirement, provided they 
are used in environments or in ways where there is little to no 
threat to unlawful targets. 64 
Two other arguments focus on the role human empathy plays 
in reducing risk to enemy civilians. First, some believe that 
substituting robot for human soldiers will result in more civilian 
deaths, precisely because robots are emotionless.65 While it may 
sometimes be lawful to use lethal force, human combatants may 
choose not to for a variety of reasons that may not be captured in 
an algorithm. This concern may well be valid; only time will tell 
whether robots will ever be capable of showing mercy. 
That being said, human emotion hardly can be credited with 
consistently ensuring civilian protection: "[H]istory is replete with 
tragic examples of unchecked emotions leading to horrendous 
suffering" in situations of armed conflict.66 Indeed, removing 
human beings from the immediacy and high emotions associated 
with combat may allow for more considered and humanitarian 
determinations regarding when and how to use lethal force. 67 
62 See, e.g., LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 56, at 30-32. 
63 See Michael Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International 
Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, 4 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. I, 10 (2013). 
64 See Crootof, supra note 48, at 36-39. 
65 See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 56, at 4, 37-39. 
66 Schmitt, supra note 63, at I 3 (citing examples); see also RONALD ARKIN, 
GOVERNING LETHAL _BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 30-31 (2009) (arguing that, 
with a perfected "ethical governor" algorithm, robot soldiers might better comply with 
the law of armed conflict than human soldiers). 
67 See Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Making the Use of 
Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL 
WORLD 374, 381 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) 
("The U.S. military has known since Vietnam at least that increased safety for fighting 
personnel allows them greater latitude in using force, encourages and permits greater 
willingness to consider the least damaging alternatives, and that putting violence at a 
remove reduces the passions and fears of war and allows a coolly professional 
consideration of what kinds, and how much, violence is required to accomplish a lawful 
military mission."). 
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A second and related argument is that, by increasing the 
temporal as well as the geographic distance between a human 
operator's decision to use lethal force and the resulting deaths, 
operators of autonomous weapon systems will be less emotionally 
sensitive and therefore more willing to use lethal force. 68 Drone 
warfare, for example, has been critiqued on the grounds that the 
physical distance between the weapon's operator and its targets 
contributes to the operator's emotional distance and a general 
dehumanization of enemy civilians.69 A frightened individual is 
no longer a fellow human being; he or she becomes merely a 
pixilated image. As a result, drone operators are presumed to be 
more comfortable using lethal force than would a soldier in the 
field. D. Keith Shurtleff, an Army chaplain and ethics instructor 
for the Soldier Support Institute at Fort Jackson, summarized this 
concern: "[A]s war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are 
removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans 
but as blips on a screen, there is a very real danger of losing the 
deterrent that such horrors provide. "70 
But, because drones are remotely piloted, geographically 
distant operators do witness the effects of their actions: "blips" 
representing human beings disappear; buildings blow up. Indeed, 
some observe that because drone operators personally monitor 
their targets-sometimes for days before the target is engaged-
they are more prone to develop an emotional connection with their 
targets than, say, pilots of manned bombers. 71 
Autonomous weapon systems, in contrast, would allow for 
both geographic and temporal-and consequently perhaps greater 
emotional-space between an operator's decision to deploy the 
weapon and the effects of that decision. As operators become 
more disconnected in space and time from the consequences of 
68 See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical 
Requirement That Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions, in THE AMERICAN WAY 
OF BOMBING: How LEGAL AND ETHICAL NORMS CHANGE 224, 234 (Matthew Evangelista 
& Henry Shue eds., 2014) (arguing that a new norm of international law, requiring a 
close temporal distance between force deployment and target engagement, is necessary 
to "keep a human conscience" in the decision to use lethal force). 
69 See, e.g., PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 395 (The Penguin Press ed. 2009). 
10 Id. at 396. 
71 Elisabeth Bumiller, A Day Job Waiting for a Kill Shot a World Away, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/us/drone-pilots-waiting-for-
a-kill-shot-7000-miles-away.html? _r=O. 
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their actions, they may be more willing to authorize the use lethal 
force, possibly at the expense of enemy civilians. 
It is far from certain, however, that the use of autonomous 
weapon systems will result in more civilian harm. To the extent 
that they allow for greater precision in targeting, their use may 
well decrease civilian risk. 72 Additionally, because they need not 
be programmed to prioritize self-preservation, autonomous 
weapon systems could be used to draw fire ( or otherwise behave in 
a self-sacrificing manner) before returning it, which a human 
combatant might not be willing or able to do.73 Some even hope to 
develop weapon systems that target only the weapon borne by a 
combatant, not its wielder, which could potentially minimize both 
combatant and civilian harm.74 
In summary, one of the primary incentives for states to invest 
in increasingly autonomous weapon systems is that such 
technology will reduce its soldiers' war-related risks. However, 
because the weapon systems themselves are emotionless and 
because their use may encourage human operators to distance 
themselves emotionally, their use may well result in additional 
enemy civilian harm. Further, as discussed in the next section, the 
minimization of combatants' risks-potentially at the expense of 
enemy civilians-may make it easier for states to enter into armed 
conflicts in the first place. · 
2. Making War Politically Easier 
For all of its horrific human costs, war is often an attractive 
option for leaders. It can divert attention from domestic problems, 
spur economic growth, and boost popularity ratings. Indeed, one 
of the primary arguments for vesting the war power in Congress is 
that many Framers believed that overbold presidents might involve 
the country in unnecessary wars. 75 James Madison noted, "the 
Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most 
prone to it,"76 and concluded: 
72 See Schmitt, supra note 63, at 25. 
73 See ARKIN, supra note 66, at 29. 
74 John S. Canning, You've Just Been Disarmed. Have a Nice Day!, 28 IEEE TECH. 
& Soc'y MAG. 16 (2009). 
75 ELY, supra note I, at 3. 
76 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798) (in 6 THE 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 312-13 (G. Hunt ed. 1906)). 
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In no part of the Constitution is more wisdom to be found than 
in the clause which confides the question of war or peace to the 
legislature, and not to the Executive department. . . . It is in 
war, finally, that laurels are to be gathered, and it is the 
executive brow they are to encircle. The strongest passions, and 
most dangerous weaknesses of the human breast; ambition, 
avarice, vanity, the honorable or venial love of fame, are all in 
conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace. 77 
Because the Executive derives "power and importance from a state 
of war," Madison also argued that the President should not be 
involved in negotiating peace treaties. 78 The more the war power 
vested with Congress, the more difficult it would be for a 
belligerent president to justify unilateral actions. 
All leaders in a representative democracy, however, must 
provide reasons for entering a conflict that justify the loss of their 
constituents' lives. Indeed, one strand of democratic peace 
theory-the theory that liberal democracies tend to go to war less 
frequently than other forms of government-rests on the 
assumption that a state's citizens usually prefer peace to war. As a 
result, their political representatives are constrained from pursuing 
war when it is not in the public interest. Similarly, Ely links 
America's history of military success to the fact that wars must be 
congressionally authorized, as that ensures broad public support 
for military interventions.79 
Conversely, it is less politically costly for representative 
leaders interested in using military force to do so when there is 
little threat to their citizens. Presidents are keenly aware of this 
and manage their media strategies accordingly. The George W. 
Bush Administration became embroiled in a controversy when it 
attempted to enforce a ban on news coverage of returning coffins 
from the Iraq War, likely because it wished to underplay the 
human costs of that war.80 To drum up popular support for (or to 
minimize popular concern regarding) its intended military actions 
m Libya and against ISIL in Syria and Iraq, the Obama 
77 James Madison, HELVIDIUS Number 4, at 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
I 06, I 08 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1985). 
78 MAX FARRAND, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 540---41 
(Yale University Press, 1911). 
79 See ELY, supra note I, at 4. 
80 See Bill Carter, Pentagon Ban on Pictures of Dead Troops is Broken, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/23/national/23PHOT.html. 
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Administration repeatedly emphasized that there would be "no 
boots on the ground. "81 
If autonomous weapon systems reduce the need for human 
soldiers-a driving aim of those investing in such technology82-it 
will make committing troops to military engagements politically 
easier. As a Navy chief petty officer dryly observed on the loss of 
his unit's PackBot: "[W]hen a robot dies, you don't have to write 
a letter to its mother."83 Accordingly, some argue that autonomous 
weapon systems threaten to undermine an intrinsic check on 
excessive warmongering, at least in democratic states. Because 
they may make war "too easy," their use may result in more 
wars-and therefore in more civilian casualties.84 Further, to the 
extent democratic peace theory accurately describes an aspect of 
international relations, it too may be threatened by the increasing 
use of autonomous weapon systems. 
This paper does not attempt to tackle the grander moral 
questions of whether there is ever an optimal amount of incentive 
for states to use force or whether it is ever possible for war to be 
St See, e.g., Press Operations, Media Availability with Secretary Hagel on Iraq in 
Delhi, India, United States Department of Defense, (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.defense. 
gov/transcripts/transcript .aspx?source=GovDel ivery& transcriptid=54 77 [hereinafter 
Hagel on Iraq] ("The president has not taken any options off the table, except that he did 
reiterate again in his statement that under no circumstances would he be sending 
American troops, boots on the ground, back into combat in Iraq."); Libya and War 
Powers: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, I 12th Cong. 14 (June 28, 
2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Dep't of State), available at 
http:/ /www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 167250.htm#ftn 16 [hereinafter Koh 
Testimony] (contrasting Libya with Vietnam in part because the latter involved "boots on 
the ground"). 
82 See, e.g., ROADMAP, supra note 3, at 25, 67. 
83 P.W. Singer, Robots at War: The New Battle.field, 2008 WILSON Q. 30, 31 
(2008). 
84 See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 56, at 39---41; see also Peter Asaro, On 
Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the 
Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-making, 94 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 687, 692 (2012). 
The fear that new technology will make wars "too easy" is hardly a new one. Most 
recently, it has been made with regard to the U.S. use of drones for targeted killing 
missions. See, e.g., Flight of the Drones, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.economis 
t.com/node/21531433 ("[T]here are fears that [unmanned aerial systems] and other 
robotised killing machines will so lower the political threshold for fighting that an 
essential element of restraint will be removed. Robert E. Lee said 'it is well that war is so 
terrible, otherwise we would grow too fond of it.' Drones might make leaders fonder of 
war."). 
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"too easy."85 However, as autonomous weapon systems are 
increasingly integrated into the U.S. military and less boots on the 
ground are necessary for engagements, it will certainly become 
politically easier to justify uses of force. 
C. How Autonomous Weapon Systems Might Affect the War 
Power 
U.S. military engagements take one of three forms: global 
wars, like World War II; so-called limited wars, like Vietnam or 
the recent Iraq War; and short-term military interventions, like 
Kosovo or Grenada.86 The possibility of employing autonomous 
weapon systems will have different implications for the war power 
depending on the type of engagement. 
For practical and political reasons, a president will probably 
not take unilateral action with the intention of embroiling the 
United States in a global war without congressional support. Not 
only does congressional authorization constitute "insurance" 
against political risk should the war go badly, long-term 
engagements will require sufficient funding. 87 Even when a 
president anticipates that a military engagement may be of a 
relatively limited form but will last for an extended period of time, 
the benefits of commencing it with congressional authorization 
will tend to outweigh acting unilaterally.88 Accordingly, 
autonomous weapon systems will likely not have much of an 
effect on the division of the war power for long-term military 
endeavors that remain within proscribed legislative limits.89 
In contrast, autonomous weapon systems will further empower 
presidents to act unilaterally when engaging in short-term military 
interventions and in expanding limited wars beyond legislative 
boundaries. Because such weaponry reduces the need for combat 
boots on the ground, there will be fewer flag-draped coffins 
returning home. Accordingly, one of the remaining incentives for 
85 Cf Anderson, supra note 67, at 395. 
86 See Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 13, at 448--49 (outlining these 
distinctions and defining what I term "global wars" as "unlimited wars"). 
87 Id. at 501--02 (discussing incentives for an Executive to have legislative support 
when commencing extensive military endeavors). 
88 Id. 
89 That being said, a lowered risk to American troops may affect Congress's 
willingness to grant requested authorizations. 
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Congress to take action to check the Executive-popular outrage 
at the loss of American lives-will be diminished.90 
Autonomous weapon systems will therefore likely have a two-
fold impact on the war power. First, autonomous weapon systems 
will allow a president to take unilateral action faster and with a 
lowered probability of a congressional check. Second, over time, 
these engagements will create precedent for future Executive 
unilateral action, regardless of whether those situations involve 
autonomous weapon systems. While a weapon may contribute to 
the ability to take a certain action or a lack of critique of that 
action, it may not be considered a relevant factor into later legal 
analyses.91 For example, President Clinton tested the limits of 
unilateral uses of force by ordering the U.S. military to continue 
air strikes in Kosovo after the War Powers Resolution's sixty-day 
deadline had passed without a congressional authorization.92 
Today, Kosovo is often cited as a precedent for the Executive's 
war powers authority, usually without clarification that the 
precedent may only be relevant to aerial bombardment. 93 
Granted, the integration of autonomous weapon systems in 
U.S. armed forces will not result in a spectacular shift in the 
division of the war power. First, the Executive's ability to 
unilaterally use military force for short-term engagements has 
already been generally accepted.94 Indeed, some would argue that 
it has even been legislatively endorsed by the War Power 
Resolution's sixty-day window, within which presidents can use 
force without congressional authorization.95 Second, drones and 
other new technologies already reduce the need for human soldiers 
on the ground; weapon systems with greater levels of autonomy 
may not drastically further reduce that number. That autonomous 
90 Alternatively, as armed forces in the field become more robotic, congresspersons 
might view armed conflicts as raising more of a budgetary than patriotic issue-and 
therefore more willing to eliminate funding for such engagements. 
91 Of course, the choice of weapon will continue to inform policy and political 
analyses. 
92 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Kosovo War Powers and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1673, 1682 (1999). 
93 Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, Air War in Kosovo Seen as Precedent in 
Possible Response to Syria Chemical Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at AS. 
94 See Waxman, supra note 11, at 1628. 
95 See Walter Dellinger, After the Cold War: Presidential Power and the Use of 
Milita1y Force, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107, 110 (1995). 
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weapon systems will be incrementally integrated into the armed 
forces will further contribute to the gradual, rather than dramatic, 
nature of this shift.96 Finally, the potential risk to soldiers is hardly 
the only consideration in a president's decision to use or expand 
the use of military force. Many factors council both for and 
against such actions, and when national security is on the line, this 
one will play only a minor role.97 
That being said, any increase in the Executive's freedom to 
unilaterally use or expand the use of U.S. military force is hardly 
insignificant. Presidents may intentionally induce a war, as 
President Polk arguably did when he had U.S. troops occupy land 
claimed by Mexico.98 Additionally, because new technology often 
inspires overconfidence, autonomous weapon systems may 
encourage presidents to underestimate the military commitment 
required to accomplish a foreign policy objective. As a result, 
even engagements intended to be minor may escalate into more 
extensive armed conflicts.99 Finally, the United States will engage 
in far more small-scale uses of force than extensive wars, which 
means there will be more opportunity for the Executive to foster a 
perception that its unilateral action is appropriate. 
Prediction is always a risky business. But it seems likely that, 
as autonomous weapon systems reduce the need for combat boots 
on the ground, congressional incentives to check a president's 
overreach will diminish-further concentrating the war power in 
the Executive's hands. 
IV. Implications for the Doctrine of Humanitarian 
Intervention 
New technology can affect international law in a variety of 
ways. A new development may raise novel legal questions 100 or 
96 Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous 
Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can, 2012 Hoover 
Inst. I (20 I 2). 
97 See Anderson, supra note 67, at 392. 
98 See Bradley, supra note 21, at I 0. 
99 Cf LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 101 
(2d ed. 1996) ("Unfortunately, the line between war and lesser uses of force is often 
elusive, sometimes illusory, and the use of force for foreign policy purposes can almost 
imperceptibly become a national commitment to war."). 
100 For example, who will be held liable for a war crime committed by an 
autonomous weapon system? The weapon system itself? Its deployer? His or her 
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require resolving long-standing legal grey areas. 101 Should new 
technology permit states to take previously impossible actions or 
render previous requirements ridiculous, new state practice may 
also cause international law to evolve in unanticipated ways. 102 
This section discusses one possible implication of U.S. presidents 
who are less restrained in using military force for short-term 
engagements due to increasingly autonomous weapon systems: 
the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. 
If U.S. presidents enjoy greater leeway in short-term military 
engagements, it is entirely possible that they will be more willing 
to engage in humanitarian interventions. Unlike other decisions to 
use military force, which will be grounded primarily in national 
security concerns, humanitarian interventions require a state to 
weigh the lives of its nationals against its willingness to aid 
another state's civilians. Unsurprisingly, states are generally 
reluctant to engage in such actions unless the risk to their nationals 
is minimal ( or unless an intervention is a fig leaf for 
accomplishing other objectives). Thus, to the extent autonomous 
weapon systems reduce risk to troops, U.S. presidents may be 
more willing to use military force to protect other states' civilians. 
To some degree, this is already occurring. 103 As noted above, 
the Obama Administration relied heavily on the argument that 
there would be no "boots on the ground" to sell the American 
public on humanitarian interventions in Libya and Syria. 104 
commander? Its programmer? Its manufacturer? Will this be a question of international 
criminal law, or rather some form of international products liability tort? 
101 The use of drones for targeted killing missions, for example, has reignited an 
ongoing debate regarding the interaction between the law of armed conflict and 
international human rights law. See Michael N. Schmitt, Unmanned Combat Aircraft 
Systems and International Humanitarian law: Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate, 30 
B.U. INT'L L.J. 595 (2012). To the extent autonomous weapon systems are similarly 
employed, they will raise many of the same issues. 
102 See Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International 
law Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2016), at 34--36 (discussing 
how the use of submarines modified treaty requirements and their associated civilian 
protections). 
!03 See Anderson, supra note 67, at 391-92 (discussing how drone warfare may 
make humanitarian interventions more likely). 
104 See Hagel on Iraq, supra note 81; see Koh Testimony, supra note 81. 
Admittedly, the Syria example is hardly strong evidence that lessened threats to troops 
will increase humanitarian interventions. Although he maintained he did not need to, 
President Obama put the question of whether to engage in air strikes to Congress. But in 
the face of "implacable opposition" from Congress, he requested that the Senate delay a 
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Drones permit relatively riskless air strikes, but they do require 
considerable manpower for their operation. Weapon systems with 
greater levels of autonomy will allow militaries to do even more-
in the air, at sea, on the ground, and in cyberspace-with less. 
Should the United States engage in more humanitarian 
interventions, its actions will affect international law. Article 2( 4) 
of the U.N. Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations."105 There are two formal exceptions to this general 
prohibition: states may use force against another state pursuant to 
a Security Council resolution or in self-defense. 106 The doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, however, suggests that individual states 
may also unilaterally use force to stop an ongoing atrocity 
perpetuated by a state against its citizens, especially when the 
Security Council cannot or will not authorize a use of force. 107 
Some scholars argue that such a customary exception to Article 
2( 4) already exists. 108 But these writers are in the minority. Due 
vote on a resolution as he pursued a diplomatic solution with Russia. See Mark Landler 
& Jonathan Weisman, Obama Delays Syria Strike to Focus on a Russian Plan, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sep. 10, 2013), at Al, available at http;//www.nytimes.com/2013/09/l i/ 
world/middleeast/syrian-chemical-arsenal.html?pagewanted=all. Clearly, then, risk to 
troops is hardly the only consideration in a state's decision regarding whether to engage 
in a specific humanitarian intervention. That being acknowledged, there will be 
situations where more of the varied factors favor a humanitarian intervention-and in 
such circumstances, the possibility of minimizing risks to troops through the use of 
autonomous weapon systems may play a more determinative role. 
105 UN Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
I 06 Id. arts. 42, 5 I. 
107 See Eve Massingham, Military Intervention for Humanitarian Purposes: Does 
the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine Advance the Legality of the Use of Force for 
Humanitarian Ends?, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 803 (2009) (discussing the history of the 
Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") and distinctions between it and the older doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention). 
108 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, The Syrian Intervention: Assessing the Possible 
International Law Justifications, 89 INT'L L. STUD. 744, 753 (2013) ("[I]t can be fairly 
argued that the right [to intervene unilaterally] has crystallized into customary law over 
the past decades."); Jennifer Trahan, Syria Insta-Symposium: Jennifer Trahan-The 
legality of a U.S. Strike on Syria, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 31, 2013, 11 :00 AM), 
http:/ /opiniojuris.org/2013/08/3 I /syria-insta-symposium-jennifer-trahan-legal ity-u-s-
strike-syria/ (arguing that unilateral intervention in Syria for the purpose of preventing a 
mass atrocity would not be unlawful, even in the absence of a Security Council 
resolution or self-defense justification). 
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to both the sacrosanct nature of Article 2(4)'s prohibition and a 
lack of consistent state practice, the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention is far from established customary international law. 109 
The United States, however, is a particularly influential 
international actor. Should it engage in unilateral humanitarian 
interventions more frequently, other states may be reluctant to 
criticize it-or they may also feel emboldened to engage in such 
actions. Over time, as certain justifications are accepted and 
others rejected by the international legal community, the doctrine 
of humanitarian intervention might evolve into a third, customary 
exception to Article 2(4)'s prohibition on the threat or use of force. 
V. Conclusion 
In keeping with his thesis in Democracy and Distrust, Ely 
grounds his war powers argument on the assumption that correct 
representative process will produce the correct substantive 
result. 110 Vesting the war power with Congress, Ely argues, 
preserves the representative goals of the Constitution: it will 
minimize the number of wars by creating institutional roadblocks, 
and it ensures that the United States will only risk the lives of its 
· citizens after careful deliberation and with broad public support. 111 
But is there a need for such deliberation when there is little risk 
to American lives? Perhaps there is less need to preserve Ely's 
envisioned deliberative process in such cases. 112 By extension, as 
autonomous weapon systems increasingly allow the Executive to 
react quickly and flexibly to changing world conditions-and 
especially to mass atrocities-without exposing American troops 
to danger, there may be little reason to be concerned with 
Executive usurpation of the war power. 
The shared nature of the war power protects more than 
American lives. It protects American interests and values. In 
I09 See Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Responsibility to Protect, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-
legality-of-military-action-in-syria/ (discussing the legality of unilateral intervention in 
Syria in the absence of Security Council authorization and a self-defense claim). 
110 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1980). 
I I I ELY, supra note I. 
I 12 See id. at 9 ("The Congress that adopted the War Powers Resolution was 
principally concerned with the safety of U.S. forces .... "). 
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addition to the monetary costs of any military engagement, a 
decision to use lethal force reflects a collective American morality, 
as it requires answering an antecedent ethical question. That 
question used to be, "For what are we willing to die?" As 
autonomous weapon systems proliferate, that question may soon 
become, "For what is our President willing to kill?" 
